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Weak-Form Judicial Review and
"Core" Civil Liberties
Mark Tushnet*
I. INTRODUCTION
Two important legacies of the Rehnquist Court are its vigorous de-
fense of free speech rights and its equally vigorous defense of judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation. For instance, the Rehnquist Court
ratcheted up the protection given commercial speech,' protected flag-burn-
ing as a means of political protest,2 and struck down regulations targeted
at hate speech.' Chief Justice Rehnquist himself was not an enthusiastic sup-
porter of many of these decisions. In contrast, he was a strong defender of
judicial supremacy-what I call strong-form judicial review-in which the
courts have the final and unrevisable word on what the Constitution means,
with legislatures and executive officials having no substantial role in in-
forming the courts' constitutional interpretations. The clearest example of
the Rehnquist Court's commitment to strong-form review came in City of
Boerne v. Flores.4 In holding that Congress has no power to "alter" the in-
terpretations the Court had given the Constitution,5 the Court took its own
decisions as defining the meaning of constitutional terms, even though the
alternative definition Congress had developed was a reasonable one.
In this Essay, I want to unearth some subordinated strands in the Rehn-
quist Court's free speech jurisprudence. For example, the Rehnquist Court
allowed Congress to regulate campaign finance in ways subject to credi-
ble First Amendment objections, 6 and to impose obligations on cable televi-
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. I would like to thank Janet Hiebert for a particularly useful formulation of the cen-
tral inquiry in this Essay.
'See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (invalidating a
state ban on advertising prices for alcoholic beverages); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525 (2001) (invalidating a state law severely restricting advertising of tobacco
products).
2 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating an ordinance mak-
ing it an offense to burn a cross when doing so will "arouse anger" on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion, or gender). Cf Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (upholding a
state law making it an offense to burn a cross with the intent to intimidate).
4521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, as beyond Congress's power to
enforce Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
I d. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
6 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), discussed in the text ac-
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sion systems that would almost certainly be unconstitutional were they
imposed on newspapers. 7 These decisions, I suggest, do not rest simply on
the kind of deference to legislative judgment that fits comfortably into a
system of strong-form review. Rather, they represent what I call a mana-
gerial model of the First Amendment, which accords legislatures a large
role in setting rules that, in the judges' eyes, aim to maximize either the
amount or the diversity of views disseminated through society.
The managerial model exemplifies what I call weak-form judicial re-
view, a form of judicial review in which judges' rulings on constitutional
questions are expressly open to legislative revision in the short run.' Drafters
of constitutions have recently embraced weak-form judicial review be-
cause it appears to go a long way toward overcoming the well-known "coun-
termajoritarian difficulty" of strong-form judicial review.9 The basic justi-
fication for weak-form review, which I develop in more detail in Part II,
is that it provides an institutional mechanism for implementing statutes
that are consistent with reasonable interpretations of constitutional rights,
while precluding the implementation of statutes inconsistent with unrea-
sonable interpretations. Most of the discussions of weak-form review de-
scribe its use in constitutional systems outside the United States, because
there is scant prospect of the U.S. system, which is in practice one of
pervasive strong-form review, being transformed into one of weak-form
review. Even discussions of weak-form review as it has been, or might
be, implemented in the United States have focused on substantive rights
at the periphery of contemporary constitutional law, such as the right to
education, or rights expressly protected by constitutionally mandated
prophylactic rules. 10
One reason for this focus may be a sense that weak-form review is
especially inappropriate for core constitutional rights, such as the right to
free expression or the right to be free from invidious racial discrimina-
companying infra notes 55-56 and note 59.
7 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997), discussed in the text
accompanying infra notes 51-52 and in note 58.
8 Having the ability to revise judicial interpretations in the short run, legislatures clearly
can do so in the medium run. What matters is that they are not confined to revision over the
long run alone. Part II of this Essay defines weak-form review more precisely and gives
examples.
9 The term, of course, is Alexander Bickel's, although-because he did not devote much
attention to the possibility of weak-form judicial review-he treated the difficulty as one
connected to the institution of judicial review as such. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (Yale
Univ. Press 1986) (1962) (describing the countermajoritarian difficulty). But see id. at 35-
46 (describing and criticizing James Bradley Thayer's "clear mistake" rule, which can be
understood as a version of weak-form review).
10 See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1022-28 (2004) (discussing right-to-
education cases); Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Ex-
perimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 452-55 (1998) (discussing Miranda v. Arizona, 396
U.S. 868 (1969)).
[Vol. 41
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tion, perhaps because legislatures that disagree with judicial interpreta-
tions of core rights are thought to be likely to infringe on those rights rather
than offer reasonable alternative interpretations. This Essay examines that
proposition. After describing weak-form review in Part II, I turn in Part
III to its potential application in cases involving the First Amendment. I
begin that discussion by sketching the ways in which hints of weak-form
review can be seen in the Rehnquist Court's First Amendment cases that
fit within the managerial model, and continue by explaining why those
hints might not be confined to the relatively narrow topics where they
have appeared. Part IV considers the reasons for refraining from engag-
ing in weak-form review with respect to the heart of the First Amend-
ment: regulation of speech critical of government policy.
In brief, weak-form review should be understood as a method of
working out the best understanding of what the Constitution properly pro-
tects through a process of exchange between the courts and legislatures
over time. Eventually, the interactions should produce a settled and cor-
rect understanding, as I argue has happened with respect to the central
rights protected by the First Amendment." A brief conclusion returns to
the comparative enterprise by connecting my analysis of weak-form re-
view in First Amendment contexts to the "margin of appreciation" doc-
trine in European law.
II. WEAK-FORM REVIEW DEFINED
The United States Supreme Court, supported by our legal culture and
the American public, has adopted judicial review in a strong form. 2 The
locus classicus articulating our commitment to strong-form review is Coo-
per v. Aaron's description of "the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution," from which the
Court said it "follows that the interpretation [of the Constitution] ...
enunciated by this Court ... is the supreme law of the land, and ... [is]
of binding effect on the States," including "[e]very state legislator and
"1 My argument is closely connected to that made by David Strauss in his defense of
the use of the common-law process in constitutional adjudication. David A. Strauss, Com-
mon Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
12 It would be helpful were I able to cite such things as surveys dealing with public and
elite support for strong-form review, but I am not a scholar of such polls and doubt that
pollsters will have formulated their questions in ways that actually probe for differences in
views on strong- and weak-form review. One hint is provided in James L. Gibson, Gregory
A. Caldeira, & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 343 (1998), which reports that 76% of those surveyed expressed an "institutional
commitment" to the Supreme Court, where that term was defined as "an 'unwillingness to
make or accept fundamental changes in the functions of the institution."' Id. at 348-50. I
suspect that some part of that number is attributable to institutional conservatism, fear of
the unknown, and a bias in favor of the status quo, but my guess is that even taking those
considerations into account the "institutional commitment" of the American people to the
Supreme Court as it currently functions is rather high.
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executive and judicial officer."' 3 The Rehnquist Court reiterated the point
in City of Boerne v. Flores:
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted
within the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the
duty to say what the law is. When the political branches of the
Government act against the background of a judicial interpreta-
tion of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood
that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its prece-
dents with the respect due them under settled principles, includ-
ing stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed. 4
In a system of strong-form review, the courts' resolution of constitu-
tional questions is final and binding on the political branches. This does
not mean that those resolutions are fixed for all time, or even that Con-
gress and state legislatures cannot do things to change them. Obviously,
we have the power to amend the Constitution to alter the judicial resolu-
tion of a constitutional question. 5 The Court's reference to stare decisis
in the Boerne opinion suggests another mechanism: the political branches
can use the appointment process to change the Court's composition over
time until there are enough justices who will repudiate the earlier inter-
pretation. What characterizes strong-form review, then, is that judicial inter-
pretations of the Constitution are unchangeable by the legislature in the
short and medium run.' 6
Comparative analysis shows how weak-form review, in contrast, al-
lows legislatures to make their own constitutional interpretations stick
even when inconsistent with relatively recent judicial interpretations. 7
For instance, Sections 1 and 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms might be taken as models for constitutional language creating judi-
cial review. 8 Section 1 provides that the rights guaranteed by the Charter
13 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
14 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (citations omitted).
" And we have done so several times. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (repudiating the
holding in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV
(repudiating in its first sentence one holding in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857)); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (repudiating the holding in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)).
16 Courts can reverse themselves in the short run, and even without a change in mem-
bership that might have been aimed at reversing a controversial decision. Except in unusual
circumstances, the legislature cannot induce a reversal in the short run. But see Knox v.
Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871) (reversing by a vote of 5-4 and after two new justices had
been appointed to the Court, the decision a year earlier in Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 603 (1870), which had been decided 4-3 by a short-handed Court).
I7 For a good introduction to weak-form review, see Stephen Gardbaum, The New Com-
monwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001).
11 The Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the "Bill of Rights" portion of the Canadian
Constitution. Formally, the Charter (and the Canadian Constitution as a whole) are enact-
ments by the British Parliament. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as
[Vol. 41
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are subject to "such responsible limits prescribed by law as can be demon-
strably justified in a free and democratic society."' 9 Section 33 provides
that Canadian legislatures can make statutes effective for renewable five-
year periods, "notwithstanding" their inconsistency with selected Charter
provisions, including the provisions dealing with freedom of expression.2"
Section 33 could be interpreted as authorizing parliaments to enact legis-
lation inconsistent with the way in which the courts have interpreted Charter
provisions.
21
My view is that these provisions have not worked in practice to cre-
ate an effective system of weak-form review,22 and thus I continue the expo-
reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985); Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). The Canadian Constitution was "patriated'.'-that is,
made amendable solely by the Canadian people-in 1982. See Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) § 2 ("No Act of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom passed after the Constitution Act, 1982 comes into force shall extend to
Canada as part of its law.").
19 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch.
II (U.K.) § 1. In R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103, the Supreme Court of Canada outlined a
multi-stage test for determining when a rights violation is "demonstrably justified":
First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right
or freedom are designed to serve, must be "of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom." ... It is necessary, at a
minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial
in a free and democratic society before it can be characterized as sufficiently im-
portant.
Second, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the party invok-
ing s. I must show that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified.
This involves "a form of proportionality test." Although the nature of the propor-
tionality test will vary depending on the circumstances, in each case courts will be
required to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups.
There are, in my view, three important components of a proportionality test. First,
the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in ques-
tion. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In
short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even
if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair "as little
as possible" the right or freedom in question. Third, there must be a proportional-
ity between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the
Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of
"sufficient importance."
Id. Paras. 73, 74 (citations omitted).
20 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch.
11 (U.K.) § 33.
. 211 mean to distinguish here between parliamentary actions that legislators concede to
be inconsistent with the Charter as they understand it, and actions that legislators take on
the ground that the courts have misinterpreted the Charter.
22 For competing views from Canadian scholars, compare KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME
COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2001) (arguing that the
Charter has created an effective system of dialogue between the Canadian Supreme Court
and Canada's national parliament), with JANET HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS: WHAT IS
PARLIAMENT'S ROLE? (2002) (arguing that there has not been a truly effective dialogue on
the Charter's meaning because the Supreme Court has resisted dialogue and Canada's par-
liaments have not tried vigorously to engage in it). The reasons for my agreement with
HeinOnline -- 41 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 5 2006
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sition of weak-form review by describing how an effective system would
use the Charter's language. Consider a regulation of commercial expres-
sion-for example, a regulation of advertising for sweetened cereals, whose
target audiences are children. Suppose the Supreme Court finds the regu-
lation unconstitutional. The Court says that the goal of promoting health
by diminishing children's consumption of sweetened cereals is a permis-
sible one, but concludes that the regulation as enacted sweeps within its
coverage too much expression that need not be regulated in order to ac-
complish a significant reduction in consumption.
The legislature has two kinds of response available under the Cana-
dian Charter. The Section 1 response is this: Bolster the record supporting
the legislation so that it provides a better-a more "demonstrable"-justi-
fication for the statute's scope. For example, the legislature might compile
evidence, if it can, showing that narrowing the statute's scope would cre-
ate administrative problems by requiring regulatory agencies to act outside
of their areas of competence or else leave advertisements on the market that
contribute significantly to the demands children make on their parents.
Note, though, that the Section 1 response takes the Court's interpretation
of the Charter to be correct and disagrees only with that interpretation's
application to the statute.23 The legislature attempts to show-"demon-
strate"-that the violation the Court discerned is indeed justifiable given
the Court's own understandings about what is needed to justify a viola-
tion. The Section 1 response, that is, does not involve a dialogue between
courts and legislatures about the general meaning of Charter provisions.
In contrast, the (idealized) Section 33 response does involve such a
dialogue. To continue the example, the parliament might enact a Section
33 override of the Court's decision because, in the legislature's view, the
Charter's provisions dealing with freedom of expression are simply inap-
plicable to commercial speech.14 This use of a Section 33 response would
be predicated on a disagreement between the court and the legislature over
what the Constitution means, not merely how it should be applied.25
Hiebert's views can be found in my reviews of these books. Mark Tushnet, Judicial Activ-
ism or Restraint in a Section 33 World, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 89 (2003); Mark Tushnet,
Book Review, 2 INT'L J. CON. L. 734 (2004).
23 ROACH, supra note 22, at 8, describes what he calls "in-your-face" Section 1 re-
sponses. These responses involve what appears to be the simple reenactment of the invali-
dated legislation with relatively little done to bolster it. Roach treats these responses as
involving decisions by parliament that merely purport to accept the Court's interpretations,
and argues that in such instances parliament should rely on the Section 33 response. See id.
at 281.
24 For an extended argument from a Canadian scholar that denying constitutional pro-
tection to commercial expression does not violate basic principles of freedom of expres-
sion, see ROGER A. SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION (2003).
25 I refer to an "idealized" version of the Section 33 response because Section 33 itself
does not clearly distinguish between a legislative response that is concededly inconsistent
with the legislature's own understanding of the Charter, and a response that is inconsistent
only with the courts' understanding of the Charter. I have noted elsewhere that the lan-
guage of Section 33 might have been clearer on what was being overridden. As written,
[Vol. 41
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Another example, the British Human Rights Act, allows for the pos-
sibility of overt disagreement over meaning rather than application. The
Human Rights Act provides that the House of Lords, in its judicial capac-
ity exercised by the Law Lords, can declare that a statute is incompatible
with fundamental human rights norms. 6 The expectation in Great Britain
is that the government would respond to such a declaration by modifying
the statute to eliminate the incompatibility, as has been invariably true to
date.27 But, in principle, the government could respond to a declaration of
incompatibility by saying that it disagreed with the House of Lords' interpre-
tation of the fundamental rights, offering its own reasoned justification for
an alternative interpretation.28
I have sketched three mechanisms by which legislatures in systems with
weak-form review might respond to judicial interpretations of the Consti-
tution with which they disagree: The Section 1 response attempts to bol-
ster the justifications for rights violations in terms the courts have already
indicated they would accept, while the idealized Section 33 response and
the possibility of parliamentary disagreement with a declaration of incom-
patibility both allow legislatures to offer their own alternative interpreta-
tions. The possibility of disagreement over the meaning of constitutional
provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights provides the basis for defend-
ing weak-form review as a good, perhaps even the best, institutional im-
plementation of democratic constitutionalism. I conclude this Part by ex-
Section 33 requires the legislature to say to the public, "We are making this statute effec-
tive notwithstanding what the Charter says." A better expression of weak-form review
would allow the legislature to say, "We are making this statute effective notwithstanding
what the Supreme Court has said the Charter says." As Canadian constitutional scholars
have pointed out to me, this point might be taken to demonstrate that the Charter actually
establishes strong- rather than weak-form review.
26 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
acts 1998/80042--a.htm. The norms are most of the norms embodied in the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. The primary exception is the provision in the European Conven-
tion requiring signatories to provide effective remedies for Convention violations. As I
understand it, the exception was made to ensure that British courts would not hold that merely
giving themselves the power to make a declaration of incompatibility was itself a violation
of the Convention because such a declaration would not be an effective remedy for the
underlying substantive violations.
27 The most dramatic example involves the House of Lords' declaration that certain
provisions of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 were incompatible with the
European Convention (and were not protected against a declaration of incompatibility by a
domestically valid derogation from the Convention). A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't
[2004] UKHL 56 (appeal taken from U.K.), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld2004O5ldjudgmt/jdO41216/a&oth-l.htm. The incompatibility arose from
two features of the legislation: it applied only to non-citizens, and it was excessive in rela-
tion to the goals the government validly could pursue. The government immediately re-
sponded by eliminating the incompatibility: it extended the statute's coverage to citizens,
and it adopted regulatory measures less restrictive than those initially imposed. Prevention
of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/20050002.
htm.
28 Obviously, the government would also have to be willing to defend its preferred in-
terpretation against a challenge brought in the European Court of Human Rights.
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plaining briefly why weak-form review is a defensible method of enforc-
ing a constitution's provisions, before turning in the next Parts to aspects
of U.S. constitutional law that can be seen as our version of weak-form re-
view.
Constitutionalism provides both the structure for, and constraints on,
democratic self-governance. 29 Some constitutional constraints, though con-
troversial in such contexts as constitution drafting, provide the framework
within which self-governance occurs. For example, people could reasonably
disagree about whether a parliamentary system or a separation-of-powers
system is the better structure for democratic self-governance. ° Once a struc-
ture is chosen, though, people work within it-or attempt to change it by
the constitution's provisions for amending the document. Notably, consti-
tutional provisions setting up these basic structures are rarely unclear or
subject to interpretation, which makes it relatively inconsequential whether
judicial review takes a strong or a weak form with respect to the basic
structural choices.
31
Other provisions, and particularly provisions identifying fundamen-
tal rights, are different, and here the choice between strong- and weak-form
review can matter a great deal. It is not that they are unconnected to the
structures of self-governance.32 What distinguishes provisions dealing with
19 For an elegant explanation of the relationship and tension between constitutionalism
and democratic self-governance, see FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY
(1999).
30 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633
(2000) (arguing that "constrained parliamentarianism" is the better structure); Steven G.
Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor Ackerman is Wrong to
Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51 (2001) (arguing that
the U.S. system of separation of powers is the better structure).
31 This is not to say that interpretive questions never arise in connection with particular
structural provisions. For example, there is today some controversy over the extent to
which Congress can control the President's decisions in areas closely related to his respon-
sibilities as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. There is no controversy, though, nor
could there be, over the proposition that the United States has a separation-of-powers sys-
tem. The interpretive disagreements are about details of the structure we have. In contrast,
interpretive disagreements about many fundamental rights provisions such as the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause arise from basic disagreements over the con-
tours of our constitutional system. Consider here competing views about the constitutional-
ity of the regulation of hate speech and pornography, and competing views about the con-
stitutionality of affirmative action.
32 To take the obvious example, protections of freedom of expression are intimately
bound up with democratic self-governance to the point that the Australian High Court has
held that Australians enjoy an implied constitutional right of political expression (of uncer-
tain contours) inferred from the fact that the constitution describes Australia as a democ-
racy, even though Australia's constitution does not contain a bill of rights protecting free-
dom of expression. Australian Capital Television Pty., Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177
C.L.R. 106. For an overview of the High Court's jurisprudence on the implied right of
political communication, see Dan Meagher, What is "Political Communication?" The
Rationale and Scope of the Implied Freedom of Political Communication, 28 MELB. U. L.
REV. 438 (2004). John Hart Ely's account of the U.S. Constitution gives a central place to
constitutional provisions that, he argues, are representation-reinforcing. JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). These constitutional provisions simultaneously con-
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fundamental rights from provisions dealing with basic structures is that
the former, unlike the latter, are typically stated in rather general terms.
Provisions that typically use general terms often differ from more specific
provisions in other normatively significant ways: as the example of the First
Amendment shows, provisions cast in general terms may identify core
constitutional liberties. These facts have important implications for de-
signing the institutions of judicial review, which are supposed to ensure
that legislation comports with constitutional constraints. The general terms
in which fundamental rights are cast, though, means that there often will
be reasonable disagreement about whether any specific statute violates
those constraints.33 The disagreement can take two forms: whether a par-
ticular statute "squares with" the constitutional provision, and what the met-
ric is.34
How should the government settle such reasonable disagreements?
Judicial review still seems to be the best way to strike down a statute that
is inconsistent with any reasonable interpretation of the Constitution's speci-
fication of fundamental rights. We might try to direct the courts to invali-
date legislation only when it is truly unreasonable, that is, inconsistent
with any reasonable interpretation of constitutional language.35 Strong-form
review makes that strategy risky, though, because there might be reasonable
strain and enable democratic self-governance as embodied in the basic structure of the U.S.
constitutional system. This combination of constraint and empowerment can be understood
to characterize a wider range of fundamental rights than Ely acknowledged. A right to be
free from torture, for example, or a right to privacy can be understood as essential to guar-
anteeing that those who participate in the processes of self-governance have sufficient inde-
pendence of mind to make that participation meaningful: a person who must worry about
being tortured if she offends the authorities, or about having his intimate personal affairs
disclosed by public officials he offends, can fairly be described as not being fully self-
governing. For Ely's discussion of whether the right to privacy is fundamental in his view,
see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920 (1973). For the leading work in political theory on the connection between non-
domination and democracy, see PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM
AND GOVERNMENT (1997).
11 The existence of strongly reasoned dissents in cases with strongly reasoned majority
opinions demonstrates this.
34 1 draw the "squares with" metaphor from United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936)
("When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to
the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty; to lay
the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and
to decide whether the latter squares with the former.").
31 See the Constitution of Sweden for one effort to do so, which appears to have been
successful at least in the sense that the court has not actually invalidated legislation to any
significant extent.
If a court or any other public body considers that a provision conflicts with a pro-
vision of a fundamental law, . . . the provision may not be applied. However, if the
provision has been approved by the Parliament or by the Government, it may be
set aside only if the fault is manifest.
Regeringsformen [RF] [Constitution] 11:14 (Swed.) (emphasis added).
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disagreement about what is unreasonable.36 That is, the courts might (mis-
takenly but conclusively) hold that a statute is inconsistent with any rea-
sonable interpretation of the constitution. More generally, if the courts
have the last word, as with strong-form review, the people run the risk of
losing their ability to govern themselves by regulating fundamental rights
pursuant to their reasonable interpretation of the constitution's con-
straints on self-governance.
Weak-form review offers a solution to this problem.37 Courts are given
the opportunity to explain why a challenged statute is unconstitutional. Hav-
ing done so, they step aside and let the legislature respond. To the extent
that courts have some advantage over legislatures in constitutional inter-
pretation, and that legislators recognize the existence of such an advan-
tage, the legislative deliberations will be informed but not controlled by
what the courts have said. But, in the end, if enough legislators believe
that the court's constitutional interpretation is not as good as their own,
weak-form review allows the legislators to have their way-putting the
people in a position to govern themselves while simultaneously operating
within the bounds set by the constitution.38
The defect inherent in weak-form review is that it provides a means
by which legislatures can make effective their unreasonable constitutional
interpretations. The extent to which this defect will actually infect adopted
legislation is an empirical question.39 Experience with weak-form review
is thin enough that no firm judgments on that question are possible. Two
points are worth noting, though. First, even in strong-form systems, it is
rare for legislatures to enact statutes that are insupportable according to
36 There is an additional risk in the U.S. system, which combines life tenure with the
absence of any constitutional provision describing the contours of judicial review. That
combination means that no one has the power to ensure that judges actually adhere to any
particular interpretive strategy. Politicians and scholars can say to the judges that they ought to
invalidate only statutes that are unreasonable under any view of the Constitution, but once
the judges are appointed there is little anyone can do if they happen to disregard that ad-
vice and invalidate statutes that are inconsistent with their own reasonable interpretations
of the Constitution, even if alternative interpretations are also reasonable. (This point treats
as ineffective the threat of impeachment for adopting what politicians regard as an im-
proper approach to constitutional interpretation.) See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CON-
STITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 163 (1999) ("We cannot guarantee that judges will act
'appropriately' when we appoint them, or by offering them a [compelling] constitutional
theory .... ").
37 At this point in my argument I think it unnecessary to specify which of the possible
mechanisms of weak-form review is desirable. (I am not sure that the choice among mecha-
nisms is susceptible to reasoned analysis, and am inclined to think that the choice when
made will depend on the historical and political circumstances under which it occurs.)
38 Provisions for constitutional amendment achieve the same result, but, in a system like
that of the United States, where the amendment process is a difficult one, legislators can
implement their preferred-and, by hypothesis, reasonable-constitutional interpretations
only in the long run.
39 One can design institutions that reduce the risk that the legislature will adopt such
laws-a legislative committee or staff charged with vetting legislation to ensure that it is
supported by some reasonable constitutional interpretation, for example-but the risk can-
not be eliminated entirely.
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any reasonable constitutional interpretation.4" And this occurs even though
legislators know that enacting such statutes is for all practical purposes al-
most cost-free because such statutes will almost certainly be invalidated.4
Second, and perhaps more important, one has to recognize that judicial
decisions sometimes-in my view, quite often-bar legislatures from acting
on entirely reasonable constitutional interpretations, and that this preclu-
sion is as much a cost to democratic self-governance as is the adoption and
enforcement of statutes inconsistent with any reasonable constitutional
interpretation."
There might be a more limited concern with weak-form review. A
critic might think weak-form review desirable, or at least acceptable, in
connection with some constitutional provisions, but think it unacceptable
in connection with other provisions. Here, I consider the suggestion that
weak-form review should be avoided with respect to core constitutional lib-
erties-those that go to the essence of the people's ability to govern them-
selves.43 Among the best candidates for such a liberty is the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of free expression. In the next Part, I argue that the First
Amendment is too broad to be a good candidate for denying the people,
through their representatives, the power to adopt and make effective their
own interpretations of what free speech requires, even if judges disagree.
III. WEAK-FORM REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, deals with
many matters, such as speech critical of government policies, commercial
expression, pornography, and libel. The standard approach the Court
takes to First Amendment issues is well known. It includes the distinction
between content-based and content-neutral regulations, and doctrines that
place substantial limits on content-based regulations. The core of First
Amendment doctrine fits comfortably with strong-form review because
40 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (referring to the incidence of strongly rea-
soned dissents in constitutional cases).
41 Only "almost cost-free" because there are costs to adopting statutes that will be in-
validated: the displacement of other items on the legislative agenda, the costs of litigation,
and the like.
42 Systematic evaluation of the net costs (or benefits) of strong- and weak-form review
is an extraordinarily complex task. For a guide to how it could be done, see Wojciech Sadur-
ski, Judicial Review and the Protection of Constitutional Rights, 22 O.J.L.S. 275 (2002)
(outlining the steps needed to evaluate the choice between strong-form judicial review and
legislative protection of constitutional rights).
43 Another possibility would be to allow weak-form review with respect to provisions
whose application to particular statutes calls for the resolution of contested questions of
social fact, such as whether enforcing the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings brought by
the government will deter substantively unconstitutional conduct. United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433 (1976) (concluding that the application of the exclusionary rule in civil tax
proceedings would not deter unconstitutional conduct). My personal view is that there is
substantial overlap between this approach and the one described in the text.
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the Court gives little weight to legislative judgments that a regulatory
scheme advances First Amendment interests.
There is, however, another approach.' Occasionally, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged the possibility that legislatures have a role to play in
interpreting the First Amendment. These acknowledgements give rise to
what I call the managerial model of First Amendment law.45 In the mana-
gerial model, legislatures have the power to adopt regulations that, in their
judgment, increase the availability of expression-net, or on balance.
The mere fact that a regulation suppresses some speech, even on the basis
of its content, is insufficient to show that the regulation is unconstitutional,
if the regulation promotes more speech than it suppresses. 46 This might
be consistent with strong-form judicial review if the managerial model left it
to the courts to determine whether the net contribution of a regulation to
the dissemination of ideas was positive.4 ' But it does not. The managerial
model requires that the courts defer to legislative judgments about the net
contribution of regulation to speech. 48 That is, the managerial model fits
44 My thinking on this question has been decisively influenced by Rebecca Tushnet, Copy-
right as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common With Anti-Porno-
graphy Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 1 (2000). For a related metaphor, see Marvin Ammori, Another Worthy Tradition:
How the Free Speech Curriculum Ignores Electronic Media and Distorts Free Speech Doc-
trine, 70 Mo. L. REV. 59 (2005) (alluding to the title of HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY
TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988)).
411 use the term "managerial" in a manner related to but different from that employed
by Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996) (referring to "mana-
gerial domains," where "the state organizes its resources so as to achieve specified ends.").
Post deals primarily with the managerial approach to a segment of government regulation
of speech, such as subsidies and the operation of government-owned facilities. With re-
spect to that segment, Post argues that the government as manager can pursue what he calls
instrumental goals, such as profit maximizing. See, e.g., Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974) (upholding a city's ban on renting advertising space on the side of city buses to
those seeking to disseminate political messages). See also Robert C. Post, Between Gov-
ernance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1713 (1987) (relying on a related concept). My approach treats the managerial view as
both broader and narrower. It is broader because it is available across the entire domain of
regulation; it is narrower because the sole relevant managerial goal is maximizing the dis-
semination of ideas.
46 The managerial view is therefore at odds with the statement in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam), that "the concept that the government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment."
47 Two standard approaches that seek to minimize the scope of managerial judgment
should be noted. One emphasizes that the relevant constitutional doctrine incorporates limita-
tions on permissible managerial judgments, which reduces the tension between the mana-
gerial view and the dominant strand of First Amendment theory. This move is prominent in
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The other proposes new doctrinal limitations that
would allow one to claim with some plausibility that the managerially inspired rules, as
modified, satisfy the dominant strand's strict standards. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh & Brett
McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107
YALE L.J. 2431 (1998); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunc-
tions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). Both moves are effectively
critiqued in R. Tushnet, supra note 44.
48 Deference on questions of fact implements what I referred to earlier as the "Section
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better with weak- than with strong-form review. Further, it offers itself as a
comprehensive account of the First Amendment, dealing with all First
Amendment issues and not simply those involving telecommunications
law, copyright, and some other discrete topics. 9 And, its presence in First
Amendment doctrine shows that there need be no deep incompatibility be-
tween weak-form review and judicial protection of fundamental liberties.
I begin by pointing out cases where the Court has acknowledged the
legislature's role in making constitutional choices when regulating speech. I
then consider and reject the possibility that those cases are somehow set
apart from the mainstream of First Amendment adjudication because of
their peculiar subject matters.5 0 Instead, I argue, the cases provide at least
hints of the managerial model. The aim in this Part is to demonstrate that
the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence provides some
space for weak-form review. Part IV examines the dominant strand of First
Amendment jurisprudence and argues that strong-form review is indeed
appropriate for laws restricting speech critical of government policy. This
is only true because that jurisprudence has emerged from a long process
of interaction between courts and legislatures-that is, it has emerged from
what can be conceptualized as a temporally extended system of weak-
form review. That discussion raises what seems to me the only remaining
question: whether the temporal extension, that is, the long period over which
interactions occur, is somehow essential to the development of good con-
stitutional doctrine with respectto core constitutional rights.
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, an important recent case
involving the First Amendment implications of regulating communica-
tions technology, involved the "must carry" provisions of federal communi-
cations law.5" Those provisions required cable television systems to commit
some channels to local broadcast stations in order, Congress asserted, to
ensure that local stations, which provided distinctive services to their com-
munities, could survive. The Court upheld the provisions, emphasizing a
number of factors. The subject matter was a "regulatory scheme[ ] of inher-
ent complexity" involving "assessments about the likely interaction of indus-
tries undergoing rapid economic and technological change."52 The Court
emphasized the "reasonableness" of Congress's predictive judgments about
I" version of weak-form review, in which courts accept legislative judgments about the
application of constitutional norms to specific statutes.
41 1 do not want to present here a full defense of the managerial model; that is a project
for another time. Rather, I want to establish only that the managerial model is present in
contemporary First Amendment doctrine. For the moment, I simply observe that (in my not
entirely unbiased judgment, I admit) R. Tushnet, supra note 44, demonstrates that the manage-
rial model makes sense of some problems with which standard First Amendment doctrine
has difficulty, and offers better solutions to other problems than does the standard doctrine.
0 1 note that it is possible to insert each decision I discuss into standard free speech
doctrine, but I believe-and intend to argue in a more developed version of this argument-
that the resulting doctrinal structures are unappealing.
51 520 U.S. 180 (1997).521 d. at 196.
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the economics of cable and broadcast television. At the least, Turner
Broadcasting shows that First Amendment cases sometimes require the
resolution of contestable factual assertions, and may not be sharply distin-
guishable from other domains of constitutional law. Or, put another way,
cases in the constitutional core-that is, those involving the First Amend-
ment-might have some characteristics of cases at the Constitution's pe-
riphery, such as those involving government regulation of business.
Justice Breyer's dissent in a case striking down regulations of the distri-
bution of indecent material over the World-Wide Web illustrates a related
feature of First Amendment doctrine. 3 The dissent referred to an earlier
opinion that had praised "constructive discourse between our courts and
our legislatures" as "an integral and admirable part of the constitutional
design."54 Justice Breyer referred to the fact that the anti-pornography statute
resulted from deliberations in Congress responding to a prior decision in-
validating Congress's first stab at the problem. Even though Justice Breyer
was writing in dissent, his observations indicate that the idea that interac-
tion between the Court and Congress over the Constitution's application,
if not over its meaning, has reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Court itself endorsed inter-branch dialogue with respect to political
speech, the core of the First Amendment, when it upheld the McCain-
Feingold campaign finance reform law.55 The doctrine the Court articu-
lated is not relevant here-what matters is the majority's statement that
"[w]e are under no illusion that [the McCain-Feingold law] will be the
last congressional statement on the matter. Money, like water, will always
find an outlet. What problems will arise, and how Congress will respond,
are concerns for another day."56 As-they need not have added-is the ques-
tion of how the Court will respond. That is, even though the opinion up-
held the legislation and therefore does not count as an exercise of strong-
or weak-form judicial review, the opinion came close to explicitly en-
dorsing the idea that the substantive law of the First Amendment would
be shaped by interactions among the public acting as campaign donors,
Congress acting as regulator, and the Supreme Court acting as the (provi-
sionally) final determiner of the Constitution's meaning. That idea is the
one that underlies weak-form judicial review.5 7
13 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). The Court merely approved a trial court's
decision that, given the record before it, the government had not shown that technology was
inadequate to limit minors' access to pornographic material without limiting the access of
adults as well.
14 Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326
(2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). Justice Kennedy was the author of the Court's opinion from
which Justice Breyer was dissenting.
55 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
56 Id. at 224.
57 For a related example of dialogic review, dealing with the problem of articulating con-
stitutional doctrine in a domain where the factual predicates for applying doctrine change
rapidly, see Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Chang-
ing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEx. L. REV. 269 (1999).
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I do not want to claim too much about these cases. At most they pro-
vide only hints of weak-form review, and the predominant strand of First
Amendment doctrine points in the direction of strong-form review. Still,
what are we to make of those hints? Against the claim that they demonstrate
an alternative view of First Amendment law (the managerial model), it
might be said that they are limited to the First Amendment's periphery. In
the main, the cases involve relatively new social phenomena-cable tele-
vision and the Web obviously so, the new methods of campaigning only
slightly less. Where the phenomena are new, perhaps an interactive form
of review is especially appropriate, giving both Congress and the courts
the opportunity to learn about the new phenomena, their constitutional im-
plications, possible new techniques-both technological and social-of
regulation, and the like.
There is another sense, though, in which the problems presented in
Turner Broadcasting and the McCain-Feingold case are neither new nor
peripheral to the First Amendment. The dissenters in both cases mounted
strong arguments that the restrictions at issue were content-based. The goal
of the regulation in Turner Broadcasting was the preservation of local
broadcast stations because Congress believed that they would distribute lo-
cally oriented programming, that is, because of the content they distrib-
uted.58 In the McCain-Feingold case, the Court upheld regulations of po-
litical advertisements-again a content-based rule.59 I think it better to un-
derstand these cases as raising to greater prominence the managerial model.
That model's best expression comes in copyright law. Consider the
analysis the Supreme Court offered when in Eldred v. Ashcroft it upheld
the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act of 1998. 6 Quoting an earlier deci-
sion, the Court said that "copyright [was] ... the engine of free expres-
sion."" As that engine, the constitutional law of copyright has two com-
ponents. First, copyright law promotes free expression-even though it
allows, indeed requires, that courts suppress speech that infringes copy-
right. Second, the Court in Eldred repeatedly emphasized that it should
defer to congressional judgments about the proper scope of copyright (and,
by necessary inference, about the proper scope of the First Amendment),62 at
58 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 229, 234 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) (reiterating her earlier conclusion in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622
(1994), that the regulations were content-based).
19 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the statute as "a law
that cuts to the heart of what the First Amendment is meant to protect"); id. at 288 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (referring to prior cases imposing "a rigorous standard of review" for
cases involving "suppression of speech").
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
61 Id. at 219 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
558 (1985)).
62 See, e.g., id. at 205 n.10 ("'it is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress
has labored to achieve"' (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990))); id. at 212
("We have also stressed, however, that it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to de-
cide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives.").
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least where Congress had "not altered the traditional contours of copy-
right protection."63
These two components are important parts of the managerial model of
free speech law. They connect that model to weak-form review by assert-
ing that the Court should defer to Congress on the very scope of permis-
sible legislation. A decision that upholds a copyright statute against First
Amendment challenge defines the scope of the First Amendment's protec-
tion. Deference to the legislature on that question implements the Section
33 version of weak-form review, in which the legislature's definition of
the content of a constitutional right prevails over a contrary judicial judg-
ment. 6
The mere existence of the managerial model in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence demonstrates that the case for strong-form review of First
Amendment claims cannot rest on a sweeping assertion that legislatures will
infringe on First Amendment rights rather than offer reasonable interpre-
tations of the First Amendment's meaning when they legislate on matters
implicating that Amendment. That observation does not rule out the pos-
sibility that legislatures are sufficiently likely to adopt unreasonable con-
stitutional interpretations in some discrete areas implicating core consti-
tutional rights such that we should avoid weak-form review in those ar-
eas.65 The next Part of this Essay takes up that possibility.
IV. STRONG-FORM REVIEW AS THE RESULT OF WEAK-FORM REVIEW
OVER TIME
The managerial view of the First Amendment-and, equivalently,
weak-form review in First Amendment cases-is an account of the roles
of legislatures and courts in free speech cases quite generally, even though it
is easiest to see in cases involving problems relatively new to the courts.
Yet, although the managerial view is not confined to such problems, the
fact that it is most evident there may account for the sense that weak-form
review and the managerial approach are inappropriate in some First
Amendment domains. I alluded earlier to implementation problems, and
suggested that one could not simply allocate strong-form review to fun-
631 d. at 221.
64 Because we do not have weak-form review in the United States, the managerial ap-
proach is only structurally similar to weak-form review, not a version of it. In particular, under
the managerial view, the courts do not initially express their own constitutional interpreta-
tion, except insofar as they hint in their opinions that, were they to consider the question of
interpretation as an initial matter, they might not come to the same conclusion that the
legislature did. For an example of such a hint, see Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208, where the Court
stated: "we are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judg-
ments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be."
65 And, perhaps, that we should avoid weak-form review entirely because it is difficult
to design a system of judicial review that will be weak-form with respect to some rights,
strong-form with respect to others.
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damental rights and weak-form review to other matters. Perhaps, though,
the line could be drawn within the domain of fundamental rights. This Part
explores that possibility, suggesting that strong-form review is most defensi-
ble with respect to problems the courts have grappled with over many years.
How might we identify the line between the domain in which weak-
form review is appropriate and that in which strong-form review is? One
possibility is that weak-form review invites repeated interactions between
legislatures and courts over constitutional meaning. One characterization
of such interactions is that they illustrate why weak-form review is some-
times called "experimentalist. '66 But sometimes an experiment ends when
the community simply concludes that it has. 67 Strong-form review might
be appropriate in such circumstances and weak-form review appropriate
when genuine uncertainty exists in the relevant community about what
the First Amendment really means.
The history of regulation of speech critical of government policy exem-
plifies how this experimentalist review might "end." The place to begin is
with Robert Bork's fundamental insight,68 which can be put this way: de-
mocratic self-governance means that the policy choices made by democ-
ratically elected representatives are entitled to be implemented as effec-
tively as is practically possible, and speech critical of those policy choices
reduces the likelihood of effective implementation to some degree. Speech
critical of government policies can be said to interfere with or undermine
those policies, and thus to interfere with or undermine democratic self-
governance.69 Providing constitutional protection for such speech therefore
hinders democratic self-governance, illustrating the tension between self-
governance and constitutionalism as enforced by means of judicial review.
Free speech law began by adopting an extremely generous standard
of review of regulations aimed at speech critical of government policies.
Such speech could be regulated, according to the Supreme Court's early
rulings, when legislatures made it a criminal offense to impede the im-
plementation of substantive policies and when properly instructed juries
concluded that the speech at issue had a tendency to increase the likeli-
hood of interference with the government policies.7" The Court also held that
legislatures could impose criminal sanctions on a category of speech if they
66 See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 10.
67 For a discussion of this phenomenon in the physical sciences, see PETER GALISON,
How EXPERIMENTS END (1987).
68 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (1971).
69 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1061 (5th ed. 2005), deals with
this aspect of free speech law under the heading "Speech That 'Causes' Unlawful Conduct."
That characterization captures by far the largest part of the phenomenon, but probably not
all: Consider the possibility that speech critical of government policy will reduce the en-
thusiasm with which some citizens support the policy, and thereby reduce the civic resources
available to implement it.
70 This is a perhaps non-standard but nonetheless accurate description of the holding in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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reasonably concluded that speech falling within the category had a general
tendency to increase the likelihood of interference with democratically cho-
sen policies.7
Under pressure from powerful dissenting opinions written by Justices
Holmes and Brandeis,72 the Court revised its approach. Holmes and Bran-
deis argued that the "bad tendency" test was a flawed standard for juries
to apply because experience showed that juries were too ready to find a
significant threat to the implementation of government policy in speech
that actually was quite unlikely to impair government policy to any signifi-
cant extent.73 They made a similar point about legislative overestimation
of the threat posed by speech falling within proscribed categories.
It took more than two decades for the Court to acknowledge the force
of these arguments, with Chief Justice Vinson writing in 1951 that the
Court's decisions in the intervening years "inclined toward the Holmes-
Brandeis rationale."74 When it did, the Court modified the standards in two
ways. It eliminated the distinction between statutes aimed at protecting
substantive policies from impairment by means of speech and statutes aimed
at regulating a category of speech. More important, it directed that juries
be instructed that they could find liability only if they went through a calcu-
lation taking account of both the degree of risk and the magnitude of harm
to the implementation of government policies.
Once again, experience placed this standard under pressure, and for
the same reasons as before. Juries instructed as the Court directed in 1951
convicted defendants of violating the law when, as the Court came to see
things, the risks to government policy were not large enough. The Court
turned to a new strategy of controlling jury (and prosecutorial) overreaching.
It would allow regulation of speech critical of government policy only when
the speech itself had certain characteristics that the Court believed could
be readily identified.7 5 In doing so, the Court made it easier for judges to
throw out erroneous convictions if they concluded that the speech at issue
did not have those characteristics.
Brandenburg v. Ohio76 took the final step. Brandenburg further refined
the list of characteristics required before speech critical of government
policy could be regulated: The speech had to use words that were an "in-
"' Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
72 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring on ju-
risdictional grounds); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71 And, implicitly, the review of jury verdicts for unreasonableness was an inadequate
check on such errors.
71 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951) (plurality opinion of Vinson, C.J.).
71 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (allowing regulation only of speech
advocating unlawful action, but not of speech advocating the doctrine that under some circum-
stances unlawful action was appropriate).
76 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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cit[ement]" to "imminent lawless action.""7 Judges could examine the chal-
lenged speech and determine whether the words were a proscribable in-
citement. Brandenburg addressed the role of juries as well. Judges were
to instruct them that the defendant had to have acted with a specific men-
tal state and that the circumstances were such that lawless action was likely
to occur. The Court's formulation meant that the words of incitement had
to have been "directed" at producing imminent lawless action and had to
have been "likely to ... produce such action."7 8
Over the course of nearly fifty years, the Court revised free speech doc-
trine to reach a point that has remained stable for almost as long.79 The deci-
sions have several characteristics that resonate with aspects of the ideas un-
derlying weak-form review."0 First, the Court upheld the regulations at issue
in the cases defining the core of First Amendment doctrine, until Branden-
burg. Doing so gave the legislatiVxe and executive branches the opportu-
nity to continue to develop regulations that would generate additional ex-
perience with the way in which governments actually went about regulat-
ing speech critical of government policy. Second, the Court regularly re-
viewed cases that allowed it to invoke collateral doctrines to invalidate
speech restrictions without directly disparaging the core of existing doc-
trine."' Third, these cases also gave the Court information about how that
core actually worked in practice. That experience led the Court to revise the
same doctrine. The stability of the Brandenburg revision can be taken as the
consolidation of strong-form review in cases involving speech critical of
government policy-the consolidation being shown by the fact that the
Court reversed a conviction and thereby precluded the accumulation of addi-
tional experience with free speech regulations. 2 We can describe the Court
as allowing governments to experiment with speech restrictions, ending the
experiment when, in the Court's judgment, the experiment had yielded all
relevant evidence. The doctrinal stability since Brandenburg shows that the
77 Id. at 447.
7s Id. Formulated to deal with problems associated with decisions by prosecutors and
juries, the Brandenburg test has been applied to cases in which private parties seek injunc-
tions or damages from judges. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Corp., 458 U.S.
886, 928 (1982).
79Contemporary sedition convictions in terrorism-related cases have been based on
jury instructions framed in the terms Brandenburg set, and on review the courts of appeals
have relied on Brandenburg. See, e.g., United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 114-15 (2d
Cir. 1999) (rejecting a facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (2000), which prohibits sedi-
tious conspiracies to use force to overthrow the United States government).
80 Only "resonate with," because the Supreme Court understood itself to be exercising
strong-form review.
81 These are the "subsequent cases" referred to in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 507 (1951).
82 An alternative account would be that the Court finally realized that its efforts to en-
courage legislatures and executive officials were not succeeding, and imposed its own restric-
tive rule. That account might be correct, but a full version would have to explain the timing
of the Court's realization.
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Court's judgment on the disutility of additional experimentation was cor-
rect.83
We should note several points about this general account of the trans-
formation of weak-form into strong-form review.
(1) The analogy to experiments does suggest that the repeated interac-
tions encouraged by weak-form review might be a good way of generating
good constitutional doctrine.84
(2) The account suggests why the Supreme Court may be attracted to
the managerial view and weak-form review in what it regards as new First
Amendment domains. Using weak-form review makes it easier for the Court
to adapt or change course as experience builds. Yet, as my discussion of
the managerial view indicates, First Amendment domains do not come
pre-labeled "old problem" or "new problem." The McConnell majority
thought that regulating modem forms of campaign finance was a new prob-
lem; Justice Kennedy thought that it was the classical problem presented
by government efforts to regulate speech based on content. Frederick
Schauer has suggested that whether the relevant community sees a prob-
lem as within the scope of the First Amendment or outside it is in the end
a question for sociologists, not lawyers.85 The same may be true of the issue
of characterizing a First Amendment problem as old or new.
(3) The account connects weak- and strong-form review. Recall that the
basic difference between those forms is temporal: weak-form review al-
lows for legislative responses to judicial decisions over a shorter period than
strong-form review does. But, the accumulated force of weak-form deci-
sions provides the basis for replacing that form with strong-form review.
Weak-form review exercised over time becomes strong-form review-and
properly so, as experience teaches us what the Constitution really means
in a particular domain.
At least one question with this account of free speech law remains
unanswered. The account relies on the development of consensus within the
relevant community that doctrine has reached a stable resting place-that
is, a correct answer. Identifying that community may be more difficult than
it initially seems. After all, free speech questions arise only when legisla-
" For a related account stressing the importance of experience in developing First
Amendment doctrine, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, Freedom of Expression Adjudication in
Europe and the United States: A Case Study in Comparative Constitutional Architecture, in
EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 47, 53-55 (G. Nolte ed., 2005).
84 The account resonates with pragmatic accounts of the process of law-making by
judges. Cf OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 98 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1963) (describing the transformation of repeated jury rulings into judge-made rules). We
might contrast the development of First Amendment doctrine dealing with speech critical
of government policy, which developed over an extended period, with First Amendment
doctrine dealing with false statements that injure reputation, where the Supreme Court's first
intervention, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), set a rather rigid standard,
which many observers believe to be unsound.
11 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Explora-
tion of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004).
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tures defend their regulations of speech as being consistent with the First
Amendment. That very assertion might be taken as a demonstration that the
needed consensus is lacking: In addition, federalism complicates the analy-
sis even more with respect to state and local regulations, because one justi-
fication for federalism is that it allows individual communities to disagree
with the normative (in this context, the constitutional) judgments made
by even an enormous majority of other communities. And, of course, the
idea motivating weak-form review is that reasonable disagreement-that
is, lack of consensus-over constitutional meaning is pervasive. I have no
strong intuitions about how to resolve the problem of identifying when a
consensus exists within the relevant community.1
6
Experience in Europe may suggest one approach to an answer here.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) enforces the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, a set of fundamental rights. In 1976, the ECHR
articulated the "margin of appreciation" doctrine.17 According to that doc-
trine, each nation adhering to the Convention can properly have its own un-
derstanding of how the Convention's provisions apply to particular prob-
lems and its own understanding of what those provisions mean.88 Varia-
tion in application and interpretation is allowed within a "margin of ap-
preciation." As to the former, the ECHR referred to the "direct and con-
tinuous contact with the vital forces of their countries," which gave national
governments a better sense than the ECHR of how it made sense to apply
the Convention in specific circumstances.8 9 As to the latter, the ECHR re-
ferred to the "rapid and far-reaching evolution of opinions" on the content of
human rights guarantees.90
The ECHR has implemented the margin of appreciation doctrine in a
manner consistent with my argument that weak-form review properly devel-
ops into strong-form review over time, thereby accommodating concerns
about the identification of the relevant community within which consensus
should be sought. The ECHR's technique has been to narrow that margin
over time with respect to specific interpretive problems as experience accu-
mulates in the ECHR and in domestic courts, producing a more "Europe-
wide" view-perhaps a consensus-on how to deal with those problems. 91
86 The relevant community might include law professors who specialize in free speech
and constitutional law, and perhaps for them (and even for everyone) the correct standard
for identifying when a consensus exists is Justice Stewart's: We know it when we see it.
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also text ac-
companying note 84 supra (arguing that the answer to a similar problem is likely to be socio-
logical rather than legal). The search for consensus should not be confined to the Court itself,
for that would reduce the process of experimentation to one of self-reflection.
87 Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976).
88 1 have formulated these points so as to evoke again the distinction drawn earlier, in
the text accompanying supra notes 18-25, between the "Section 1" and the "Section 33" re-
sponse to a judicial interpretation of a constitution.
89 Handyside, at 48.
9 Id.
9' For a discussion, see R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE
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Although U.S. constitutional doctrine does not expressly invoke margins
of appreciation, a full account of the emergence of strong-form review in
First Amendment cases might profit from incorporating that idea. Perhaps
we might take the Rehnquist Court's sporadic invocation of the manage-
rial model of First Amendment law as the parallel in U.S. law to the in-
vocation of the "margin of appreciation" doctrine-and its generally vig-
orous protection of free speech rights as the result of historical processes
by which that margin was narrowed.
V. CONCLUSION
Weak-form review offers a normatively attractive mechanism for al-
leviating the counter-majoritarian difficulty. One common objection to the
creation of weak-form review is that it is unsuitable for core liberties like
free speech. By fleshing out the notion of weak-form review and the mana-
gerial model of First Amendment law, we can make sense of some aspects
of U.S. constitutional doctrine that are difficult to understand using stan-
dard First Amendment doctrines and the idea of strong-form review. Hav-
ing seen how the managerial model and the idea of weak-form review illu-
minate existing constitutional doctrine, perhaps some of the concerns about
weak-form review itself might be alleviated.92
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al.
eds., 1993), excerpted in Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 564-66 (1999).
92 I think it appropriate as well to use a final footnote to observe that this essay has
been informed by comparative constitutional law without arguing that institutional or doc-
trinal developments in other constitutional systems should be directly incorporated into
U.S. constitutional law. As I have suggested elsewhere, the function of comparative consti-
tutional law is to assist our thinking about domestic constitutional law. See Mark Tushnet,
Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some Cautionary Notes, with Reference to
Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REV. 649 (2004).
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